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The Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses:
Conflict or Coordination?
Mr. Justice Stewart recently charged that the Supreme
Court has been applying the establishment clause liter-
ally while using a "balancing of interests" approach to
the free exercise clause. The author of this Note exam-
ines the charge in the light of the leading Supreme
Court decisions on the many facets of religion. She con-
cludes that although the Court has used language that
might indicate a literal or absolute approach to the
establishment clause, the results reached have not been
inconsistent with a balancing approach; indeed, if an
absolute approach had been used, there might often
have been a conflict between the two clauses themselves.
I. INTRODUCTION
The first amendment places two explicit restrictions on gov-
ernmental power- relating to religion: Congress may make no
law respecting an "establishment of religion," nor may it pro-
hibit the "free exercise" of religious belief.' Historically, the
courts did not determine which of these religion provisions had
been breached;3 religious rights were simply held to be protected
by the first amendment without any effort made to distinguish
between its clauses. More recently, however, the Supreme Court
has analyzed each of the first amendment's religion clauses inde-
pendently.4 The bifurcation of the first amendment's religious
provisions coupled with their disparate interpretation has pro-
1. While the first amendment refers specifically only to Congress and
the federal government, its provisions have been made applicable to the
states by means of the fourteenth amendment. E.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 US.
421, 423, 430 (1962); Torcaso v. Wat~kins, 367 US. 488, 492 (1901); Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 309 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 5(1947); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 US. 105, 108 (1943); Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
3. See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 138 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
4. See, e.g, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.. 421 (1962); Braun-
feld v. Brown, 366 US. 599 (1961).
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duced attempts by commentators5 and the Court' to reconcile
them.
In addition, the charge has been made by Mr. Justice Stewart,
in Sherbert v. Verner 7 that the Supreme Court's recent inter-
pretations of the free exercise and establishment clauses are in-
consistent and that these conflicting interpretations obscure the
proper scope of religious freedom in the United States. Specifi-
cally, Mr. Justice Stewart alleged that the Supreme Court
has employed an absolute approach in its interpretation of the
establishment clause, which has resulted in an "insensitive" and
"wooden"" construction of that provision; conversely, that the
Court has utilized a balancing approach in construing the free
exercise clause, affording that provision a more fluid and realistic
interpretation.
These approaches- absolute and balancing- are the two
basic techniques that might be used by the Supreme Court in
construction of the first amendment's religious provisions. The
absolute approach, advocated by Mr. Justice Black for both
clauses, places great stress on the words "Congress shall make
no law" in the amendment's opening phrase. Mr. Justice Black
5. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1950); Iatz, Free-
dom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 426 (1953); Kur-
land, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cni. L. Rsv. 1
(1961); Moore, The Supreme Court and the Relationship Between the "Es-
tablishment" and "Free Exercise" Clauses, 42 TExAs L. REv. 142 (1963).
6. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring);
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (opinion of Clark, J.);
id. at 230 (Brennan, J., concurring); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
(Black, J.).
7. 374 U.S. 398, 413 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
8. Id. at 414.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I. (Emphasis added.)
For example, Mr. Justice Black's approach would prohibit the familiar
"In God We Trust" on currency. It would also prohibit state and federal
legislation exempting religious organizations from state obligations including:
service performed as a member of a religious order not subject to tax as
employment under the Old Age and Survivors section of the Social Security
Act, 60 Stat. 978 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 410(a)(8)(B) (1958); service
as an employee of a religious group not included within the Unemployment
Compensation section of the Act, 74 Stat. 984 (1961), 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(8)
(Supp. IV, 1962); Workmen's Compensation Acts in which religious organiza-
tions are excluded on the ground that they are nonprofit organizations; State
labor relations acts, which have been held inapplicable to charitable hospitals;
and Fair Employment Practice Acts excluding employees of religious institutions
on the ground that it would be unfair to compel religious organizations to hire
members of another church group. Paulsen, Preferment of Religious Institu-
tions in Tax and Labor Legislation, 14 LAW & CONTEINIP. PRon. 144, 156 (1949).
A host of tax exemptions, deductions, and credits which have been granted
has argued that the first amendment means what it says ° and
that the history and language of the Constitution and its amend-
ments withdraw from government all power to legislate in certain
areas." He has further maintained that the courts have neither
the right nor the power to review the original decisions of the
constitutional framers or to make a different evaluation of the
importance of the rights granted in the Constitution. Therefore,
where conflicting values exist in the field of individual liberties
protected by the Constitution, Justice Black believes that that
document settles the conflict absolutely.?
In sharp contrast to the absolute approach is the balancing
technique, which involves a weighing in a particular case of the
conflicting secular and sectarian interests.u The basic premise
on both state and federal levels would be declared unconstitutional. These
include, on the state level, exemption from real estate and personal property
taxation for such things as houses of worship and lands, personalty devoted
to religious schools and colleges under clauses applicable to charitable organ-
izations, residences of ministers, ,property employed in the publication of re-
ligious tracts, private libraries of ministers, religiously owned property used
for entertainment, religious camp meeting grounds, and sales to religious insti-
tutions and admissions taxes. Van Alstyne, Tax Exemptions of Church Prop-
erty, 20 OHio ST. LJ. 461, 507 (1959). See also Note, 49 COLrTh. L. IRtv. 968
(1949); Comment, 5 Vnir. L. REv. 255 (1959).
Similarly this approach would invalidate Senate and House rules providing
for the taking of oaths, provided by S. Doc. No. 14, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1959), and those providing for the closing of each day's session with prayer,
id. at 3; H.R. Doc. No. 458, 85th Cong., 9d Sess. 318 (1959).
10. 'I Tead 'no law ... abridging' to mean no latw abridging." Smith v.
California, 361 US. 147, 157 (1959) (concurring opinion). See also Cahn,
Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37
N.Y.U.L. REy. 549, 554 (1962).
11. "[Tjhe principles of the First Amendment are stated in precise and
mandatory terms and unless they are applied in those terms... the free-
doms of religion, speech, press, assembly and petition will have no effective
protection." Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.. 399, 422-23 (1961) (dissent-
ing opinion).
12. Ibid.
However, to treat this method as a sufficient answer to questions of whether
and in what manner the first amendment applies in a -particular case is to
imply that its terms are self-defing; that prefabricated answers to all questions
in the area of religion can 'be found by a rigid application of the first amend-
ment's text. The absence of defining standards provided by the general lan-
guage of the Constitution and -the corresponding difficulty in application of
broad terms to concrete questions has given rise to the Supreme Court's fre-
quent use of the balancing approach, which originated in Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147 (1939), regarding the constitutionality of a city ordinance pro-
hibiting handbill distribution.
13. The balancing test, simply stated, holds that when the first and four-
teenth amendments' guarantees of the liberties of speech, press, association,
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of this approach is that the absolute language of the first amend-
ment's provisions must have been intended to be subject to un-
stated exceptions to be determined by the Supreme Court;14 since
there are no clearly protected areas, all are subject to invasion
wherever "competing interests" are sufficiently compelling." For
example, freedom of religion,' protected by the free exercise
clause of the first amendment, has long been held exempt from all
civil disabilities or penalties so long as the reasonable laws of the
government and the rights of other members of society are ob-
served. 17 Under Mr. Justice Black's thesis, freedom of religion
would be an absolute right free of all government regulation; but
the Supreme Court at an early date rejected this approach with
respect to the free exercise clause, determining that although the
religious provisions of the first amendment encompass both the
freedom to believe and the freedom to act, the former is absolute
but the latter of necessity cannot be.'
Since balancing has been openly employed in the area of free
exercise, the validity of Mr. Justice Stewart's charge must be
examined primarily in the area of establishment. This Note will
reveal that recent Supreme Court interpretations of the estab-
lishment clause, although couched in absolute language, have
and conscience conflict with some assertion of governmental power, a court
must do its work of adjudicating between the parties to the conflict by a
"weighing of the competing interests." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
524-25, 542 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
14. This does not mean, however, that the words of the Constitution aro
not to be taken into consideration. "The fact that the Constitution which he
invokes is written means that he [the judge] must pay a substantial respect
to the words in it, no matter how much he may feel that the society would
be better if they had not been written, or if different words were in the Con-
stitution." Henkin, Some Reflections on Current Constitutional Controversy,
109 U. PA. L. P~v. 687, 656 (1961).
15. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Although Talley and Dennis, see note 13 upra,
involve freedom of speech rather than religion, the language of each is broad
enough to encompass all freedoms protected by the first amendment. See also
Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865, 867 (1960); Frantz, The First
Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE LJ. 1424 (1962).
16. Freedom of religion has been defined as involving liberty of conscience
and worship, of advocacy and affiliation, and observance of customs and or-
ganization for religious purposes. Stokes, supra note 5, at 16.
17. E.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
18. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345 (1890). In implementing this
balancing approach the Supreme Court has accorded freedom of religion a
"preferred position" compared to other rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946); Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania, $19 U.S. 105 (1943). In essence, this preferred status permits the regu-
employed the balancing technique and therefore are consistent
with the Court's interpretations of the free exercise clause; and
further, if the Court were to employ an absolute approach in in-
terpreting the establishment clause only, a conflict between the
first amendment's two clauses might result.
11. SHERBERT V. VERNER AS A BASIS FOR
MR. JUSTICE STEWARTS CHARGE
Mr. Justice Stewart's charge, that the Court has interpreted
the establishment clause absolutely, was leveled in Sherbert v.
Verner. 9 In Sherbert the Supreme Court required South Carolina
to pay unemployment compensation to a Seventh Day Adventist
prevented from working on Saturday by her religious convictions.
The Court held that since the state's denial of compensation was
not based upon a sufficiently compelling state interest, such de-
nial unreasonably restricted appellant's free exercise of religion.
The Court further stated that the granting of compensation did
not constitute an establishment of the Seventh Day Adventist
religion2
lation of freedom of religion only where, and to the extent that, such regula-
tion is actually necessary "to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests
which the State may lawfully protect." West Virginia State Board of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). Freedom of religion has therefore been
subordinated to a state's right to maintain order on the public streets, Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), and to state criminal and child labor laws,
see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Prince v. Afassachusetts,
821 U.S. 158 (1941); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In those
areas in which both the Gtate and the religious organization or individual
believer have competing interests, the Supreme Court has had no alternative
other than to employ a balancing test to weigh the competing interests in-
volved. Furthermore, unreasonable restrictions on the free exercise of religious
belief have been declared unconstitutional, and city ordinances flatly prohibit-
ing distribution of all literature or circulars without consent of city officials
whose discretion is unfettered have been held prima facie invalid as applied
to Jehovah's Witnesses. Schneider v. State, 30B U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City
of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). The Supreme Court has also ruled that Je-
hovah's 'Witnesses may not be denied access to streets of a company town,
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) or to those of a town owned entirely
by the United States, Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946). And in Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) the Court declared that the distribution
of religious tracts by Jehovah's Witnesses is not subject to a tax on com-
mercial activities as a tax on the privilege of delivering a sermon. Neverthe-
less, religious freedom may be abridged when there exists a sufficiently
compelling state interest to justify such action.
19. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
20. Various state courts have also upheld exemption from unemployment
eompensation statutes on similar grounds. See, e.g., Swenson v. Employment
Security Conm'n, 340 MIch. 430, 65 N.W.2d 709 (1954); In the Matter of
19641 NOTE
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The Sherbert decision emerges, however, as an example of the
Court's balancing technique, for the sectarian interest in the pro-
tection of the free exercise of religion was balanced against the
secular interest in the enforcement of an unemployment compen-
sation statute.2' Sherbert would be a difficult case if an absolute
approach had been applied to the establishment clause: Com-
pensation of the appellant would necessarily be denied because
any aid to the religious function would be precluded as an estab-
lishment, thereby yielding conflicting results between the free
exercise and establishment clauses. The Court was, therefore,
faced with the alternative of either sanctioning a violation of
the free exercise clause in upholding the burden placed on the
Seventh Day Adventist's religion or applying a balancing test to
the establishment clause. Apparently the Court in Sherbert did
in fact employ a balancing approach in weighing the severe re-
striction on religious liberty against the indirect aid afforded the
religious function.12 Thus, conflict between the two provisions
was avoided, and Mr. Justice Stewart's charge that the estab-
lishment and free exercise clauses have been interpreted by dif-
ferent standards is not supported by the decision in Sherbert.
I. VALIDITY OF MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S CHARGE
IN RELATED AREAS
A. SUNDAY CLOSING
Although in Sherbert the Court did not apply different tests
to the two clauses, Mr. Justice Stewart did not confine his charge
to that case alone; rather he challenged other recent Supreme Court
Miller, 243 N.C. 509, 91 S.E.2d 241 (1956); Tary v. Board of Review, 101
Ohio St. 251,119 N.E.2d 56 (1954).
21. South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act, S.C. CODE §§ 68-1
to -404 (1962).
Of the 47 states which 'have eligibility provisions similar to those of the
South Carolina statute, only 28 appear to have given administrative rulings
regarding the eligibility provisions of persons whose religious convictions prevent
them from accepting available work. Twenty-two of these states have held
such persons entitled to benefits, although apparently only one such decision
rested on the federal constitutional ground that constituted the basis of the
decision in Sherbert. See 111 U. PA. L. Rnv. 253, & n.3 (1902); 34 N.C.L.
REv. 591, 602 n.60 (1956).
22. Professor Kurland has suggested that a Sabbatarian exemption might
constitute a violation of the establishment clause. Kurland, supra note 5. The
basis of his argument is that the exemption is classified in terms of religion -
one who is a Sabbatarian is being isolated from the rest of society and being
given preferential treatment because of a religious belief. Kurland's theory is
that a religious classification should never be constitutionally permissible.
However, the Court has held that such classification is not per se constitu-
decisions, including those dealing with Sunday closing legislation.
The first of the major Sunday closing law cases, McGowan v.
Maryland ,a involved an attack on a Maryland statute by em-
ployees of a discount store who were arrested and convicted for
selling various articles on Sunday in violation of the statute."4
The employees argued that Sunday closing laws constituted an
establishment because originally they were designed to accomplish
religious objectives and because they benefit those religions that
observe Sunday as part of their religious precepts. The Court held
that these statutes, while historically of a religious nature, at
present combined both religious and secular objectives and found
that the secular objective in favor of a uniform day of rest was
of sufficient prominence to protect the statute against charges
of establishment. Indeed, this approach is not unlike that taken
in Braunfeld v. Brown,2 5 in which the Court upheld a Sunday
closing law challenged as violative of the free exercise clause. The
statute in Braunfeld was attacked by Orthodox Jewish storekeep-
ers who were compelled by their religion to remain closed on
Saturday; the Court reasoned that even though Braunfeld's free
exercise of religion was burdened, the burden was only indirect, -'
i.e., the Sunday closing law did not make unlawful Braunfeld's
religious practice itself, and the legislature's secular objective to
provide a uniform day of rest for all citizens was superior.T
tionally impermissible, see Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 866 (1918),
and in fact is sometimes required. Follett v. McCormick, 321 US. 573 (1944);
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 819 U.S. 157 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943).
23. 866 US. 42,0 (1961).
24. While the statute was challenged as a law "respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," id. at 422, the Court held
that the appellants lacked standing to raise a question of religious infringe-
ment and thus the opinion purported to deal with the establishment question
alone.
25. 866 U.S. 599 (1961).
26. "[T]he Sunday law simply regulates a secular activity and, as applied
to appellants, operates so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs
more expensive." Id. at 605.
"To strike down, without .the most critical scrutiny, legislation which im-
poses only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion... would radically
restrict -the operating latitude of the legislature." Id. at 606.
27. The latter statement outlines the technique employed by the Court
in adjudicating both Braunfeid and McGowan. Although the establishment
and the free exercise clauses may appear separable, in reality their functions
often overlap; once a challenged statute is supportable as furthering substan-
tial interests other than the promotion of religious belief, the constitu-
tional guarantees prohibiting religious establishment or interference with free
exercise are satisfied. Thus, if the primary end achieved by a statute is the
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Under an absolute approach to the establishment clause, pre-
cluding all forms of aid to religion, the statute in McGowan
would have been unconstitutional. Such a decision in McGowan
would, in turn, have posed difficult problems in Braunfeld, for
balancing has been readily employed in reference to the free exer-
cise clause;28 it would thus be possible to have a Sunday closing
statute violative of the establishment clause but valid under the
free exercise clause. In Sunday closing law cases, the Court has
avoided this conflict by employing the balancing technique in
applying both clauses, concluding that the state policy in favor
of a uniform day of leisure is sufficient to justify both the inci-
dental aid to religion and the indirect burden on religious liberty.25
B. JuxR DUTY
In the absence of a predominant secular objective, such as the
uniform day of rest in Braunfeld v. Brown, state action that in-
fringes an individual's religious practices has been held violative
of the free exercise clause. The Court was faced with this situation
in the recent case of In re Jenison,80 involving an appeal from a
contempt citation for relator's failure to comply with a Minnesota
jury duty statute on the ground that her religious beliefs pre-
cluded her from judging her fellow man. The Court, in a per
curiam decision, remanded the case to the Minnesota court with
instructions to reconsider it in light of Sherbert v. Verner.81 Ac-
cordingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the infringe-
ment of relator's free exercise of religious belief was not justified
affirmation or promotion of religion, the regulation is beyond the power of
the state. This is equally true where the statute furthers secular and religious
ends by means unnecessary to the advancement of secular ends alone.
28. See cases cited notes 17 & 18 .npra.
29. Mr. Justice Stewart viewed Braunfeld as posing no establishment
problem but felt that the economic burden on the religious observances of
Orthodox Jews who wanted to keep their businesses open on Sunday consti-
tuted an infringement of their free exercise of religion. Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
30. 375 U.S. 14 (1963).
31. 374 U.S. 398 (1968). While adherence to the tenets of an established
and organized religious faith dictated relator's objection to service in Jenison,
the Minnesota Supreme Court also addressed itself to the problem of jury
duty exemptions grounded on purely personal conviction unrelated to a definite
doctrine. In discussing this question, the Minnesota court stated that if a
refusal to serve were based on 'such a personal objection, the trial court would
be required -in each case to determine whether the assertion of a belief pro-
tected by the first amendment was in good faith or spurious. In Jenison the
requisite good faith was provided by relator's preference of a jail sentence to
compromise of her faith. In re Jenison, 125 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. 1963).
by the secular interest in procuring competent jurors3 2 The ques-
tion not discussed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, however,
was whether the exemption created for Mrs. Jenison would consti-
tute an establishment. An absolute approach to the establishment
clause in Jenison would result in the same difficulties inherent in
Sherbert v. Verner - the free exercise clause would require an
exemption for religious practices while the establishment clause
would prohibit one. Indeed, Jenison presents an even more appeal-
ing case than Sherbert for using the balancing approach to the
establishment clause: it not only avoids the conflict between the
two clauses, but a finding of establishment would have caused
Mrs. Jenison to be imprisoned whereas Airs. Sherbert would have
suffered only an economic loss.
C. EDUCATION
1. School Transportation
Recent interpretation of the establishment clause has occurred
primarily in those cases arising in the area of education. In the
earliest of these, Everson v. Board of Educ.,s the Supreme Court
upheld a New Jersey statute providing for the use of public funds
to furnish bus transportation for parochial as well as public school
students. While the language of the opinion indicated that the
Court was using an absolute approach to the establishment
clause,34 yet, by weighing the discrimination against religious-
affiliated schools that would have resulted if the statute had been
Jenison poses interesting problems in light of Torcaso v. Watlins, 367 U.S.
488 (1961), in which the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional on free
exercise and establishment grounds a state statute requiring prospective office-
holders to swear to a belief in God before assuming public office, and United
States v. Seeger, 326 F.ed 846 (2d Cir. 1964), 4B Alum. L. Piv. 771, in which
the Second Circuit allowed a conscientious objector unaliuated with an organ-
ized religious Saith to claim exemption from military service. Thus, under the
Torcaso and Seeger rationale, neither religion nor irreligion is to be preferred
as against the other and in a Jenison situation if an individual unaffiliated
with an organized sect but possessed of a private belief which prevented him
from .%erving on a jury refused such service, the Court would arguably be
required to allow the exemption.
32. In re Jenison, 125 N.W.2d 588 (Ann. 1963).
38. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
34.
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor
influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No per-
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declared unconstitutional3P5 against the type and amount of aid
afforded the religious function that would have been received by
the schools if the legislation had been upheld, the Court really
employed a balancing test.36 The decision apparently turned on
the secular objective of the statute and the relatively insignificant
amount of aid it provided to religion. Everson, therefore, is not
an example of the absolute interpretation of the establishment
clause advocated by the Court throughout its opinion.
Under the absolute interpretation of the establishment clause
set forth in the Everson opinion itself, the New Jersey statute
would have been declared an unconstitutional establishment, be-
cause the religious function permeated the parochial school sys-
tem. Again, if the Court had adhered to an absolute interpreta-
tion of establishment, a free exercise question would have been
raised since the first amendment also prohibits discrimination
-son can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities
or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jef-
ferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended
to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."
830 U.S. at 15-16.
35. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court, argued that to deny compen-
sation to parochial schools would impose u discriminatory economic hardship
on those taxpayers sending their children to parochial schools, for they would
in effect -be supporting two school systems while those individuals whose
children attended public schools would receive a subsidy from the state in
the form of free bus transportation.
[The First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations
with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require
the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so
as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.
330 U.S. at 18.
36. Mr. Justice Black employed the so-called "child benefit" doctrine under
which legislation achieving a public purpose such as the advancement of edu-
cation is constitutional even though it incidentally aids religion. See also Coch-
ran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930) (upholding the pur-
chase of nonreligious books with state tax funds for students in -private and
parochial schools).
37. By analogy -to the free exercise cases, the Everson legislation may be
regarded as an instance of government intervention in an area in which the
governmental and religious functions overlap. The Court has held that in
such areas activity by both religion and government is permissible. See, e.g.,
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws); Bradfield
v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (appropriations to hospital, maintained under
religious auspices, for 'treating indigent patients).
against religions; to afford public schools advantages denied to
parochial schools solely because of the latter's religious affiliation
might constitute an abridgment of the free exercise clause.3 8
2. Released Time
In those cases, unlike Everson, in which no clear secular inter-
est is present, the Court has seemingly applied an absolute ap-
proach to the establishment clause rather than a balancing ap-
proach. For example, in McCollum v. Board of Eduo.39 the Court
found that a state statute providing for released-time instruction
on school premises, absent a valid secular purpose, violated the
establishment clause. The Court's lack of express balancing might
well lead to the conclusion that the absolute approach was used,
yet the decision can reasonably be explained in terms of balanc-
ing. Since there was no secular objective against which the re-
leased-time program, a solely religious interest being advanced by
the tax-established and tax-supported public school system, could
be balanced, the Court had no alternative but to declare the legis-
lation unconstitutional. The Court's finding of unconstitution-
ality could also have been predicated on a violation of the free
exercise clause, because the operation of the released-time pro-
gram - a program having no independent, primary, secular goal
- resulted in compromising the beliefs of the complainant's
child:40 The Court, referring to the fact that public property was
used for the dissemination of religious doctrines,41 each time em-
phasized this by alluding to the fact that the public school ma-
chinery was being used to foster attendance at religious classes?2
Since the statute in McCollum would violate both the establish-
ment clause - under either an absolute or a balancing approach
8. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), is the only case in
which the Supreme Court has actually recognized the constitutional right of
parents to send their children to parochial schools. While Pierce involved no
first amendment questions when decided, it has acquired a first amendment
stature. Since no school child was coerced to attend parochial schools, the
Pierce decision did not involve a free exercise question. Similarly, to allow
parochial schools the benefit of public welfare legislation does not coerce indi-
vidual nonbelievers but may rather be upheld as an accommodation of re-
ligious practices. Kauper, Church, State and Freedom- A Review, 52 Mic,.
L. Itv. 829, 839, 842 (1954).
39. 83 U.S. 203 (1948).
40. See Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional
Standard, 47 -MmiN. L. REv. 329, 353 (1963).
41. 833 U.S. at 09, 212.
42. Mr. Justice Black, for the majority in McCollum, stated in Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 316 (1952) (dissenting opinion) that it was his inten-
tion that the "decision would have been the same if the religious classes had
not been held in the school buildings."
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- and the free exercise clause, unlike Everson and Sherbert there
would be no possibility of conflict between the first amendment's
clauses.
The question of the validity of released-time instruction did not
become a dead issue following the decision in McCollum. Four
years later the issue was again presented to the Supreme Court in
Zorach v. Clauson,'43 a case involving a New York released-time
program providing for religious instruction during school hours
but outside the school building. The Court's decision was based
primarily on a finding that Zorach was distinguishable from
McCollum. The Court noted that the aid to the religious program
was of lesser magnitude in Zorach44 and that the conducting of
religious instruction on school premises indirectly coerced non-
participants in McCollum to conform to the group activity. In
Zorach, since tax funds were not directly used to support the pro-
gram and since there could be no indirect coercion by conducting
the program outside the school, the Court reasoned that the
activity violated neither the establishment nor the free exercise
clause. McCollum indicated, however, that a compulsory released-
time program would constitute state aid to religion whether or
not it was conducted on school premises, for such a program con-
stituted "an invaluable aid . ..[in providing] pupils for their
religious classes through use of the State's compulsory public
school machinery. ' 4 Further, a child retained in public school
while others were dismissed for religious instruction 4 would still
be subjected to indirect coercion to participate in the program. 47
The Zorach Court clearly did not use the absolute approach
to the establishment clause- if they had done so, they would
have had to invalidate the program- in fact, the Court's lan-
guage appears to have affirmatively adopted the balancing ap-
proach.4 8 But even the balancing approach as applied to Zorach
43. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
44. Id. at 308-09.
45. 833 U.S. at 212.
46. Under the system in Zorach "a released child who fails to attend re-
ligious classes has no excused absence . . . and is thus a truant." 61 YA.LE
L.J. 405, 411 (1952).
47. While the Court failed to find any evidence of coercion in the record
before it at the time, at least one writer feels that due to the presence of
indirect coercion, Zorach was incorrectly decided. Choper, supra note 40, at
863. See also Note, The Constitution and Released Time, 52 COLUM. L. Rav.
1033, 1038 (1952).
48.
In the McCollum case the classrooms were used for religious instruc-
tion and the force of the public school was used to promote that in-
struction. Here, as we have said, the public schools do no more than
NOTE
should result in a finding of establishment. There was no greater
secular purpose for the legislation than in McCollum; absent a
secular purpose, there is nothing against which to balance the
state aid to a religious activity.
Another difficulty with Zorach is that the decision creates a
direct conflict between the establishment and free exercise clause.
Notwithstanding that the Court observed that "it takes obtuse
reasoning to inject any issue of 'free exercise' of religion into the
present case,"'49 in the very next paragraph of the opinion the
Court conceded that the released-time system might coerce public
school students into religious classrooms and if this were so "a
wholly different case would be presented." 0 In fact Zorach was
just such a "different" case. The group pressures inherent in the
classroom situation might have tended to influence conformity in
small children; the desire to conform might leave dissenting chil-
dren virtual outcasts and might in addition coerce students of
weak conviction toward unwanted religious training.'l Thus, the
Zorach program, if not found to be an establishment, should have
been found to violate the free exercise clause. This result would
be consistent with a finding of establishment by either the balanc-
ing or absolute approach.
S. Prayers
In Engel v. Vitale52 the Supreme Court found recitation of
the New York Regents' prayer53 as a regular part of the daily
accommodate their schedules to a program of outside religious instruc-
tion. We follow the McCoUum case. But we cannot expand it to cover
the present released time program unless separation of Church and
State means that public institutions can make no adjustments of their
schedules -to accommodate the religious needs of the people. We cannot
read into the Bill of Rights such a philosophy of hostility to religion.
343 U.S. at 315.
49. Id. at 311.
50. Ibid. On the other hand, the religious objective could have been more
constitutionally served by a system of "dismissed time" in which all children
would have been released at an early hour in order to permit those who de-
sired to attend religious schools while those who did not were left to pursuits
of their own choosing. In ithis way classroom pressures on nonconforming
children would be reduced since they would not be required to remain in
school, and the taxpaying parents of nonbelieving children would not be
required to support a religiously oriented program offensive to their personal
beliefs. See -generally Choper, supra note 40.
51. Id. at 390-91, 395. But see Note, 52 CoLum. L. REv. 1033, 1037-38
(1952).
52. 370 U.S. 4-1 (1962).
53. "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we
beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." Id.
at 422.
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opening exercises of a public school to be an establishment of
religion. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the majority, couched his
opinion in terms of an absolute approach: "governmental endorse-
ment of that prayer seems relatively insignificant when compared
to the governmental encroachments upon religion which were
commonplace 200 years ago . . . [but] 'it is proper to take alarm
at the first experiment on our liberties.' , Yet, the decision may
still be viewed as utilizing the balancing approach, for the Court
appears to have found no secular interest to justify the encroach-
ment on the prohibitions of the establishment clause. Given the
absence of such a secular interest against which to balance the
religious encroachment, there is a fortiori an establishment. By
phrasing its finding of establishment in absolute terms, however,
the Court unnecessarily added to the confusion present in the
field of religion and education.
Although the Court did not consider whether the Regents'
prayer violated the free exercise clause as well as the establish-
ment clause, it did recognize that laws prescribing a particular
form of religious worship might, although not necessarily, impose
an indirect coercive pressure on religious minorities to conform
to the official plan.5  Since the group pressures to participate in
the religious program were at least as strong as those the Zorach
Court suggested were present in McCollum, "" the Engel Court
might well have found a violation of the free exercise clause. Thus,
like McCollum, a finding of a violation of the free exercise clause
coupled with the violation of the establishment clause - by ap-
plying either an absolute or a balancing approach - preclude a
conflict within the first amendment.
4. Bible Reading
The practice of Bible reading in the public schools was also
found to constitute a prohibited establishment of religion by the
The daily procedure was adopted on the recommendation of the State
Board of Regents, a governmental agency created by the state constitution
to which the New York Legislature had granted ,broad supervisory, executive,
and legislative power over the state's public school system. See, e.g., N.Y.
CONST. art. V, § 4; N.Y. EDUc. L-w §§ 101, 120, 202, 214-219, 224, 245, 704,
801.
54. 370 U.S. at 436.
55. This conclusion is supported by the opinion's recognition that laws
that place the "power, prestige, and financial support of government behind
a particular religious belief" plainly result in indirect coercive pressures. 370
U.S. at 431.
56. See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra.
Supreme Court in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp5" even
though school children could avail themselves of the privilege of
nonparticipation. Although the Court again employed absolute
language in discussing the prohibitions of the establishment
clause, 8 in considering the purely religious nature of the exer-
cise59 in relation to the lack of a legitimate secular function served
by it, the Court apparently resorted to a balancing test 0 The
Court declared the program unconstitutional because no relevant
secular purpose existed to balance against the religious nature
of the program.
The Bible reading programs in Schempp also involved free
exercise questions, for to have sustained them might have resulted
in an infringement on the free exercise of religion of those indi-
viduals -who did not regard the Bible as a religious document.
Even though any child could be excused from participation, the
dissenting school children would likely be ruled by group mores,0'
and to avoid unpleasant consequences of not conforming, they
57. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The opinion combined discussions of two Bible
reading cases: Abington School Dist. v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett.
58. "[The Establishment Clause .. . withdrew all legislative power re-
specting religious belief or the expression thereof." Id. at 222.
59. "[T]he religious character of the exercise was admitted by the State.
But even if its purpose is not strictly religious, it is sought to be accom-
plished through readings, without comment, from the Bible." Id. at 224.
60.
The test may be stated as -follows: what are the purpose and the
primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibi-
tion of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative
power as circumscribed by the Constitution.... [T]o withstand the
strictures of the Establishment Clause -there must be a secular legisla-
tive purpose end a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.
Id. at 222.
For other illustrations of -the principle that where first amendment free-
doms are or may be affected, government must employ those means which
will least inhibit the exercise of constitutional iberties, see FRusmD, Tim
Surmw COURT op THE UThsDm STATES, 86-87 "(1961); Note, State Sunday
Laws and the Religious Guarantees of the Federal Constitution, 73 HA. L.
Ruv. 729, 743-45 (1960); 74 BIAuv. L. :Rv. 611, 613 (1961). Compare Miller v.
Cooper, 56 N.M. 355, 244 P.9d 520 (1952), in which a state court permitted
the holding of public school commencement exercises in a church building
only -because no public building in the community was adequate to accommo-
date the ceremony.
61. Although the complaining school child, Donna Schempp, had never
voiced her objections to the program and on occasion even volunteered to
read the Bible ,herself, it was stated that "indeed the lack of protest may
itself attest to the muccess and the subtlety of the compulsion." Schempp v.
School Dist., 177 F. Supp. 398, 407 (ElD. Pa. 1959).
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might have succumbed to these pressures and participated, con-
trary to their religious beliefs.2
Like Engel, then, the facts that the balancing approach and
the absolute approach would both yield a conclusion of establish-
ment and that there might also have been a violation of the free
exercise clause preclude any conflict within the religious clauses
of the first amendment.
CONCLUSION
Despite the Supreme Court's recent use of absolute language
in interpreting the establishment clause, it has in fact consistently
employed a balancing technique. Therefore, Mr. Justice Stewart's
fears regarding a present conflict between the approach to the
free exercise clause and the establishment clause are probably
unwarranted. On the other hand, such language may furnish the
seed for future applications of absolutism.
Various arguments may be advanced against an adoption of
the absolute approach. Initially, this approach is unrealistic when
applied to a dynamic society in which the desirability of advanc-
ing various interests often results in conflict0 5 In contrast, the
balancing approach demands that abstractions, absolutes and
selective history 4 employed by those advocating an absolute test
be abandoned, thus resulting in more particularized and rational
decisions. The result of adopting an absolute approach would also
necessitate the condemnation of many state supported religious
62. See Pollack, Public Prayers in Public Schools, 77 H~nv. L. Rzv. 62
(1963). Although Justice Stewart in dissent felt that the presence of a free
exercise violation was merely conjectural since there had been an insufficient
showing of coercive pressure, even he -ecognized that if the cases -had con-
tained evidence that the timing of the Bible reading was such as to handicap
children who did not wish to listen, or that the excusal provision was so ad-
ministered as to carry overtones of social inferiority, then impermissible
coercion would clearly exist. By analogy to the situation in Engel, it may
reasonably be inferred that indirect coercion of disbelieving children did exist
and hence the Court in invalidating the Bible reading exercises both fore-
stalled an establishment of religion and secured its free exercise. 374 U.S. at
318-20 & n.8.
63. As was stated as early as 1897, "absolute, arbitrary power exists no-
where in this free land." Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 296. See also
Griswold, Absolute Is in the Dark-A Discussion of the Approach of the
Supreme Court to Constitutional Questions, 8 UTAH L. Rnv. 167 (1963).
64. "There is no reason to assume that the insights of the Founding
Fathers into the nature of religious freedom are the very last insights vouch-
safed to Americans." Feilman, Separation of Church and State in the United
States: A Summary View, 1950 Wis. L. Rnv. 427, 429.
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practices previously sanctioned by the Supreme CourtO' How-
ever, under the interpretation suggested by this Note, an inquiry
into the desirability of the absolute approach to the establishment
clause is unnecessary; the Court will necessarily be required to
employ a balancing test, for in certain instances an absolute ap-
proach will result in a direct conflict between the two clauses of
the first amendment. It is therefore imperative that the Court
phrase its future decisions in language more adapted to the meth-
ods it is employing in reaching its results. If the present situation,
in which the establishment clause is defined in absolute terms but
is actually construed under a balancing technique, is remedied
65. There are certain practices, conceivably violative of the establishment
clause, the striking down of which might seriously interfere with certain re-
ligious liberties also protected -by the first amendment. Provisions for churches
and chaplains at military establishments may afford one such example. There
has been considerable difference of opinion throughout United States history
regarding -the advisability of furnishing chaplains at government expense.
Comare Washington's order directing the officers of each regiment to pro-
cure chaplains for the Continental Army, July 9, 1776, in 5 Tim WrrmcGs or
GEORGE WASHmaGTONq 244 (Fitzpatrick ed. 1932), iith views in Letter From
James Madison to Edward Livingston, July I0, 182, in 9 Tim WnrrWs oP,
JAmms M"isox 98, 100-03 (Hunt ed. 1910). The similar provision by state
and federal governments for chaplains in penal institutions may afford
another example. See, e.g., Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.9d 233 (2d Cir. 1901);
In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 Pad 417, 12 Cal. Rep. 753, cert. denied,
368 U.S. 864 (1961); McBride v. McCorkle, 44 NJ. Super. 468, 130 A.2d 881
(App. Div. 1957); Brown v. McGinnis, 10 N.Y.2d 531, 180 NXE.2d 791, 225
N.Y.S.2d 497 (1962); Comment, 62 CoLum.-. L. Rsv. 1488 (1962); 75 HAnv. L.
Rsv. 837 1962).
Provisions that arguably contravene the establishment clause might be
sustained on constitutional grounds as necessary to secure to the members
of the armed forces and prisoners their rights of worship guaranteed under
the free exercise clause. Since the government has deprived such individuals
of their opportunity to practice their beliefs at places of their choice, govern-
ment may, in order to avoid infringing free exercise guarantees, provide sub-
stitutes. Such a principle might support, for example, the constitutionality of
draft exemptions for -ministers and divinity students, the excusal of children
from school on their respective religious holidays, and the allowance by gov-
ernment of temporary use of public buildings by religious organizations when
their own churches have become unavailable because of a disaster or emer-
gency. Cf. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 889-390 (1918). Compare
SmLEY" & JACOB, CoNscRIxnoN OF CoNscMHc (1952), with Conklin, Con-
scientiou Objector Provisioe: A View in the Light of "Torcaso v. Watkins,"
51 Gno. L.,. 252 (1963). See also 48 MiNN. L. REv. 771 (1964).
Tax exemptions and aids which incidentally 'benefit churches and religious
institutions along with many secular charities and nonprofit organizations may
also be justified since if religious institutions benefit it is in spite of rather than
because of their religious character -religious institutions simply share benefits
which government makes generally available to educational, charitable
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by the Court, Mr. Justice Stewart's fear of a conflict between
the two clauses will evaporate and future decisions can be derived
through a process in which neither the language nor the practicali-
ties of each fact situation is ignored.
groups. See generally ToRPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF REsIaIous RiaITS IN
A MERICA 118-70 (1948); Louisell & Jackson, Religion, Theology and Public
Higher Education, 50 CALIF. L. RFv. 751, 773-80 (1962); Sutherland, Due
Process and Disestablishment, 62 HARv. L. Rnv. 1306, 1386-38 ,(1949); Van
Alstyne, Tax Exemption. of Church Property, 20 Omo ST. L.J. 461 (1959);
58 CoLum. L. REV. 417 (1958); 7 DE PAUL L. REv. 206 (1958); 9 STA. L.
REv. 366 (1957).
As among religious beneficiaries, the tax exemption or deduction is justified
as nondiscriminatory treatment available to small as well as large religious
'bodies, to popular and unpopular sects, and to those organizations which
reject as well as those which accept a belief in God. See, e.g., Washington
Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Fellow-
ship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394
(Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1957). This impartiality precludes a finding of a
violation of free exercise. See Choper, supra note 40, at 384.
Nor should the first amendment -be construed so as to prohibit the study
of the Bible in the public schools as a work of literature or the Last Supper
as a work of art. No first amendment violation should -be found in the study
of religion in literature, music, art and -history since ,these are all secular sub-
jects properly within the competence of public school teaching authorities. See
Address by Wilbur G. Katz, Northwestern University Law School, Mar. 21,
1963. When, however, the Bible is read not as a work of literature, but as the
Word of God, the first amendment under either an absolute or balancing
approach rightly places it outside the scope of government, and this practice may
not be constitutionally engaged in even if there were no objection on the part
of any parent and even if the public school community were homogeneously reli-
gious. American public educational practice "disapproves of indoctrination with
reference to matters of belief." Comm. on Religion & Education of the Amer-
ican Council on Education, Religion in Public Education, 42 RELiGIous EDUCA-
TION 129, 161 (1947).
